Stupidity of A. K. Azad in Religion and Politics

 بِسۡمِ اللّٰہِ الرَّحۡمٰنِ الرَّحِیۡمِ

In the Name of Allah, the Rahman, the Merciful

يا نبي سلام عليك

It is regrettable that a man as apparently learned as Abul Kalam Azad (1888-1958) opposed the establishment of Pakistan and threw in his lot with the Hindus and the Congress. But having studied this strange man I came to the realization that he did not absorb into his psyche the sense of loyalty to Islam and the Millat due in part to his having been a ghair muqallid (non-conformist) and not a traditional, orthodox Sunni Muslim.

He scandalously eulogized the antichrist Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian when the latter died, as editor of the Vakil, Amritsar, in its issue of 30 May, 1908.

He likewise praised, quite excessively, the false Mahdi of Jaunpur, calling him “Hazrat” and invoking the prayer “may Allah have mercy on him” (Tazkira, p.32)

Acknowledging that Muhammad Jaunpuri laid claim to being the Mahdi, A. K. Azad nevertheless says about his founding of the heretical Mahdawi sect:

میرا خیال ہے کہ اس کی بنیاد صداقت وحق پرستی پر پڑی تھی

اور خود سیّد محمد اور ان کے پیرووٴں کی پہلی جماعت کے اکثر بزرگ بڑے ہی پاک نفس اور خدا پرست لوگ تھے۔

“I think that its foundation was based on truthfulness and righteousness…Sayyid Muhammad himself and most of the elders of the first group of his followers were very pure and God-fearing people.” (Ibid, p.45)

More shocking than this, A. K. Azad even wrote that he believes that Muhammad Jaunpuri was indeed a Mahdi, though not the specific promised Mahdi prophesied to appear in the End Times:

میرا خیال یہ ہے کہ سید محمد اپنے اس دعوے میں سچّے تھے کہ مہدی ہیں

“I think Sayyid Muhammad was truthful in this claim to being the Mahdi.” (Ibid, p.60, footnote)

A. K. Azad joined the Indian National Congress, even serving as its president for several years at a very critical juncture in history.

Commenting on the term Pakistan, A. K. Azad revealed his total unfamiliarity with the letter and spirit of Islam:

“I must confess that the very term Pakistan goes against my grain. It suggests that some portions of the world are pure while others are impure. Such a division of territories into pure and impure is un-Islamic and is more in keeping with orthodox Brahmanism which divides men and countries into holy and unholy—a division which is a repudiation of the very spirit of Islam.” (India Wins Freedom, p.150)

As if Islam does not teach the holy and unholy binary, and the concepts of purity and impurity! Do we not call Palestine the Holy Land and Jerusalem Al-Quds which literally means the Holy? Pakistan means pure land, the implication is it is for a pure people, the Believers, who have separated themselves from an unholy and unclean nation of idol worshipers. Nothing could be further from the truth than to suggest such a thing is “a repudiation of the very spirit of Islam.”

A. K. Azad goes on to compare the scheme for Pakistan to Jewish Zionism, but in the process unwittingly reveals his sympathy for the latter:

“Further, it seems that the scheme of Pakistan is a symbol of defeatism and has been built up on the analogy of the Jewish demand for a national home…One can sympathise with the aspiration of the Jews for such a national home” (ibid)

Imagine the audacity! Here is supposedly a Muslim, and no ordinary Muslim, but a Maulana, a learned cleric of Islam, condemning the scheme for Pakistan while expressing sympathy for Zionism and the establishment of a Jewish State.

A. K. Azad remained with the Hindu dominated Congress, in opposition to the Muslim League which truly represented the religious, political, cultural, social and economic interests of the Muslims in its struggle for Pakistan. But even he had to confess that important figures in the Congress, and the Congress as an institution, were animated by Hindu communalism and disdain for the Muslims. Concerning Sardar Patel, he says:

“two things happened at the time which left a bad impression about the attitude of the Provincial Congress Committees. I have to admit with regret that both in Bihar and Bombay, the Congress did not come out fully successful in its test of nationalism. The Congress had grown as a national organisation and given the opportunity of leadership to men of different communities. Thus, in Bombay Mr Nariman was the acknowledged leader of the local Congress. When the question of forming the provincial Government arose, there was general expectation that Mr Nariman would be asked to lead it in view of his status and record. This would however have meant that a Parsee would be the Chief Minister while the majority of members in the Congress Assembly Party were Hindus. Sardar Patel and his colleagues could not reconcile themselves to such a position and felt that it would be unfair to the Hindu supporters of the Congress to deprive them of this honour. Accordingly, Mr B. G. Kher was brought into the picture and elected leader of the Congress Assembly Party in Bombay. Mr Nariman was naturally upset about this decision…We all knew that truth had been sacrificed in order to satisfy Sardar Patel’s communal demands. Poor Nariman was heart broken and his public life came to an end.” (Ibid, pp.16-17)

As if this wasn’t bad enough, A. K. Azad relays another such example of foul play motivated by Hindu communalism, this time involving the sidelining of a Muslim leader in the Congress:

“A similar development took place in Bihar. Dr Syed Mahmud was the top leader of the province when the elections were held. He was also a General Secretary of the All India Congress Committee and as such he had a position both inside and outside the province. When the Congress secured an absolute majority, it was taken for granted that Dr Syed Mahmud would be elected the leader and become the first Chief Minister of Bihar under Provincial Autonomy. Instead, Sri Krishna Sinha and Anugraha Narayan Sinha who were members of the Central Assembly, were called back to Bihar and groomed for the Chief Ministership. Dr Rajendra Prasad played the same role in Bihar as Sardar Patel did in Bombay.” (Ibid)

Commenting on these incidents, A. K. Azad says:

“These two instances left a bad taste at the time. Looking back, I cannot help feeling that the Congress did not live up to its professional ideals. One has to admit with regret that the nationalism of the Congress had not then reached a stage where it could ignore communal considerations and select leaders on the basis of merit without regard to majority or minority.” (Ibid, p.18)

Returning to Sardar Patel, A. K. Azad furnishes further examples of his communalism and bigotry toward the Muslims in the context of the Partition violence that had erupted in Delhi in 1947, while Patel was Home Minister:

“Another incident which occurred about this time revealed clearly how Sardar Patel’s mind was working. He perhaps felt that some explanation was necessary for the attacks on Muslims which were taking place every day. He accordingly put out a theory that deadly weapons had been recovered from the Muslim quarters of the city. His insinuation was that the Muslims of Delhi had collected arms to attack the Hindus and the Sikhs, and if the Hindus and the Sikhs had not taken the first offensive, the Muslims would have destroyed them. The police recovered some arms from Karol Bagh and Sabzi Mandi. Under Sardar Patel’s orders, these were brought to the Government House and kept for our inspection in the ante-chamber of the Cabinet Room. When we assembled for our daily meeting, Sardar Patel said that we should first go to the ante-chamber and inspect the captured arms. On our arrival we found on the table dozens of kitchen knives that were rusted, pocket knives and pen knives with or without handles and iron spikes which had been recovered from the fences of old houses, and some cast iron water pipes. According to Sardar Patel, these were the weapons which the Muslims of Delhi had collected to exterminate the Hindus and the Sikhs. Lord Mountbatten took up one or two knives and said with a smile that those who had collected these materials seemed to have a wonderful idea of military tactics if they thought that the city of Delhi could be captured with them.” (Ibid, pp.232-233)

So rotten was Sardar Patel’s attitude toward the Muslims, who were suffering from a major pogrom in Delhi under his watch, that Gandhi felt it necessary to undertake a fast in protest against him:

“Gandhiji said that he saw Muslims of Delhi being killed before his own eyes. This was being done while his own Vallabhbhai was the Home Member of the Government of India and responsible for maintaining law and order in the capital. Patel had not only failed to give protection to Muslims but he dismissed lightheartedly any complaint made on this account. Gandhiji said that he had now no option but to use his last weapon, namely to fast until the situation changed. Accordingly he began his fast on 12 January 1948. In a sense, the fast was directed against the attitude of Sardar Patel and Patel knew that this was so.” (Ibid, p.235)

A. K. Azad explains that Sardar Patel, in his heart of hearts, was desirous of the partition of India so as to be rid of the Muslims in general and the Muslim League in particular:

“He openly said that he was prepared to have a part of India if only he could get rid of the Muslim League. It would not perhaps be unfair to say that Vallabhbhai Patel was the founder of Indian partition.” (Ibid, p.198)

The naive A. K. Azad, who foolishly opposed the Two Nation Theory, was beginning to realize that his own dear colleagues in the Congress not only understood it but in a sense subscribed to it too:

“I was surprised and pained when Patel in reply said that whether we liked it or not, there were two nations in India. He was now convinced that Muslims and Hindus could not be united into one nation. There was no alternative except to recognise this fact. In this way alone could we end the quarrel between Hindus and Muslims…I was surprised that Patel was now an even greater supporter of the two nation theory than Jinnah. Jinnah may have raised the flag of partition but now the real flag bearer was Patel.” (Ibid, p.201)

Although not as overtly communal as Sardar Patel, Jawaharlal Nehru was nonetheless a devious and cunning politician who also, from A. K. Azad’s point of view, was greatly responsible for the division of India and betrayal of core principles the Congress and the nationalist movement supposedly stood for. A. K. Azad says about Nehru:

“Jawaharlal is however very vain and cannot stand that anybody else should receive greater support or admiration than he.” (Ibid, pp.137-138)

In 1946, A. K. Azad stepped down from the presidency of the Congress to make way for Nehru, who would go on to become independent India’s first Prime Minister. He admits in this book “that this was perhaps the greatest blunder of my political life. I have regretted no action of mine so much as the decision to withdraw from the Presidentship of the Congress at this critical juncture. It was a mistake which I can describe in Gandhiji’s words as one of Himalayan dimension…I can never forgive myself when I think that if I had no committed these mistakes, perhaps the history of the last ten years would have been different.” (Ibid, p.162)

What A. K. Azad is referring to is the statement to the press in Bombay by Nehru on 10 July, 1946, to the effect that the Congress was not bound by its agreement to the Cabinet Mission Plan which the Muslim League had reluctantly accepted as a settlement to the communal problem. Realizing that in the very presence of the British in India the Congress was shamelessly going back on its word and having an attitude of disrespect toward the Muslim minority, the Qaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah wisely withdrew the Muslim League’s assent to the Cabinet Mission Plan and restated the demand for a separate Pakistan. When the Congress hastily attempted to reassure the British that they would honor their agreement and were thus invited to form a provisional government, the Qaid-e-Azam realized that desperate times called for desperate measures and proclaimed a course of Direct Action Day to signal that the Muslim masses had had enough of the dirty politics. Violence broke out in Calcutta. Commenting on this development, A. K. Azad says, “This was one of the greatest tragedies of Indian history and I have to say with the deepest of regret that a large part of the responsibility for this development rests with Jawaharlal. His unfortunate statement that the Congress would be free to modify the Cabinet Mission Plan reopened the whole question of political and communal settlement. Mr Jinnah took full advantage of his mistake and withdrew from the League’s early acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan. Jawaharlal is one of my dearest friends and his contribution to India’s national life is second to none. I have nevertheless to say with regret that this was not the first time that he did immense harm to the national cause.” (Ibid, p.170)

In truth, the Qaid-e-Azam’s call for direct action in that press conference on 29 July, 1946, as routine political and diplomatic engagement with the system was proving ineffective was his master stroke.

The carnage in Calcutta paved the way for all the key players, including the Congress and the British, finally agreeing to partition. They realized that if the choice was between a divided India or an India mired in constant violence between Hindus and Muslims then a divided India was preferable. In this way, the Qaid-e-Azam forced both the Congress and the British to come to their senses and agree to the establishment of a separate Muslim homeland called Pakistan.

Regrettably, A. K. Azad remained unpersuaded, and went to the extent of blaming Nehru as the one ultimately responsible for the division of India:

“I told Jawaharlal that I could not possibly accept his views. I saw quite clearly that we were taking one wrong decision after another. Instead of retracing our steps, we were now going deeper into the morass. The Muslim League had accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan and a satisfactory solution of the Indian problem seemed in sight. It was at this stage that Jawaharlal had made his unfortunate declaration at a press conference in Bombay. When as Congress President he declared that the Congress had not accepted anything but to participate in the Constituent Assembly, he had given Mr Jinnah a chance of withdrawing from the League’s earlier acceptance of the plan…Now a situation had arisen where we were becoming greater supporters of partition than Jinnah. I warned Jawaharlal that history would never forgive us if we agreed to partition. The verdict would be that India was divided not by the Muslim League but by Congress.” (Ibid, p.202)

One is astounded by the fact that A. K. Azad, despite all he has revealed in these pages, remained with the Congress and committed to the project of Indian nationalism against his better judgment. He knew first hand the duplicitous nature of those Hindu politicians he considered his close friends and colleagues, and how they were communal in their heart of hearts.